АКТУАЛЬНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ
СПЕЦІАЛЬНИХ ТА ГАЛУЗЕВИХ СОЦІОЛОГІЙ

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DESPOTIES AND DICTATURAS
IN POTESTAR AND TOTALITAR SOCIETY:
PROBLEMS OF DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS
IN ELITHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF POLITICS (PART 1)

In the article is build a descriptive and analytical differential characteristic of despotisms and dictatorships, potestary and totalitarian societies.

It's accented that in operating with the concepts of dictatorship and despotism, a huge semantic confusion is often allowed. It is explained, in part, by the moral and ideological bias of researchers, who are dominated by the desire not so much to analytically represent this phenomenon as to form stereotypes of a biased attitude towards both the former and the latter, with their polar opposite structural and functional features. It's noticed that at the same time, the above-mentioned bias can be strengthened by the work of the media, which resort to the use of emotionally colored vocabulary, trying either to demonize despots and dictators, uniting them into one group, or vice versa, to charismaticize their rule when the corresponding social order is hidden behind it.

It's noticed that we are unlikely to be interested in the motives and intentions that drive various actors in their desire to extremely denigrate or whitewash dictators and despots. It's accented that the author of this study does not share the evaluative approach in the interpretation of dictatorship and despotism, since he considers it to lead away from the subject of the study. In portraying the era of dictators and

despots, there will always be wars, victims, blood, torture, cultural and resource-economic losses, humiliation and suppression. Neither despotisms nor dictatorships can avoid all of the above.

It's explained that behind a similar "phenomenology" of bloodletting and sacrifices, there is a different structural and functional "ontology" of societies, their centralizing states and political regimes. Above this "ontology" rises a hierarchy of cultural and social identities that portray dictatorship and despotism as a specific cultural and social system. At the same time, the cultural and social system recurses in visual features of the body/face, observable behavior, non-verbal communications, accompanying symbolic environments, and visual features of the daily practices of despots and dictators.

Key words: despotie, despotism, dictatorship, potestary societies, totalitarian societies, pre-modern cultural and social systems, modern cultural and social systems.

Formulation of the problem. In operating with the concepts of dictatorship and despotism, a huge semantic confusion is often allowed. It is explained, in part, by the moral and ideological bias of researchers, who are dominated by the desire not so much to analytically represent this phenomenon as to form stereotypes of a biased attitude towards both the former and the latter, with their polar opposite structural and functional features. At the same time, the above-mentioned bias can be strengthened by the work of the media, which resort to the use of emotionally colored vocabulary, trying either to demonize despots and dictators, uniting them into one group, or vice versa, to charismaticize their rule when the corresponding social order is hidden behind it.

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But behind a similar "phenomenology" of bloodletting and sacrifices, there is a different structural and functional "ontology" of societies, their centralizing states and political regimes. Above this "ontology" rises a hierarchy of cultural and social identities that portray dictatorship and despotism as a specific cultural and social system. At the same time, the cultural and social system recurses in visual features of the body/face, observable behavior, non-verbal communications, accompanying symbolic environments, and visual features of the daily practices of despots and dictators.

The purpose of the study is to build a descriptive and analytical differential characteristic of despotisms and dictatorships, potestary and totalitarian societies.

Analysis of previous studies and publications. A.N. Medushevsky in the article "Revolution and Dictatorship" notes that "a simple comparison

of the ancient forms of tyranny with the revolutionary regimes of Cromwell and Napoleon, and them, in turn, with the totalitarian states of Hitler, Stalin and Mao makes it possible to be convinced …" that "with a common continuity and the similarity of many parameters, there is a qualitative difference in the amount of control over society, the degree of concentration of power and the nature of its legitimation…" [4]. Let us clarify, which is methodologically important in the context of our study.

This clarification stems from the need to shift the evaluative emphasis that traditionally appears in the semantic field of the concepts of "totalitarianism", "totalitarian regime" and so on. the same terms. Resemantization is motivated, in particular, by the fact that the perception of totalitarianism in the Arendtian-Popperian paradigm of liberal and positivist-biased science is "attached" to negative emotional and evaluative stereotypes. Traditionally, they are associated with terror, ethnic cleansing, protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens, the persecution of the opposition and the prohibition of a multi-party system, censorship in the media, extra-procedural reprisals against politically disloyal citizens, and so on.

Researchers who ignore the liberal load of such meanings quite often identify totalitarianism with despotism, which, from a conceptual and terminological point of view, looks incorrect and tendentious. So, it is completely incorrect to call, in this context, the communist eastern feudal despotism of the USSR totalitarianism, since the logic of this system was (and, in fact, remains) purely mechanistic and compilatory.

In this sense, despotism and despotism correspond not to totalitarianism as an ideology and not to a totalitarian regime, but to potestarism as an ideology of unlimited violence, which becomes a denial of the organic concept of cultural and social order. In totalitarianism as an ideology of integrity (the integration of the whole and its parts, in which the whole "represents" in parts, and the parts express the whole as its "microcopies"), the principle of organicity is substantiated.

In practice, this means an inextricable cultural connection, co-dependence, participation of all institutional subsystems, social institutions, social groups with each other, sharing a single social space by them. In the most primitive sense, the concern of the whole with the parts implies the "exclusion of the exception", i.e. the absence in such a society of exclusion groups who would have the power to exercise exclusion, as well as groups on which the first groups entrust the mission of "sacrifice", outcast and marginalization.

Potestary societies are inherently mechanistic, since their history of formation involves jerks, leaps and plantings. Any potestary society is valueless in the sense that it uses political tools for the production and implementation/dissemination of cultural values, which contradicts the very essence of culture, but is quite compatible with quasi-culture. The "gluing" of society with the help of politics is usually indicative of states that, in the course of their historical development, experienced the experience of importing cultural elites and internal (cultural) colonization.

Soviet society in the indicated aspect is an eclectic (mechanistic) compilation of: 1) elements of the Middle East nationwide communal slavery in agriculture; 2) socialist feudalism in industry and public administration (it is worth talking about industry, which was created, in fact, by German and American specialists); 3) elements of early simulation modernity in the field of science and education; 4) some elements of urban infrastructure, but, in all their components, retaining signs of unfinished / understaffed 4) fragmented class of the feudal system with its "island" customary law, the norms of which differ from group to group, 5) parallel world of autarkic feudal comfort, surrounded by dullness , dirt and everyday unsettledness of servile estates – workers, peasants, "intelligentsia" (in fact – disciplinary, if you use the correct terminology to refer to a social group that was supposed to perform propaganda, mentoring and pedagogical and (in combination – supervisory and police functions) in a class society)).

This idea concerns, among other things, the criminal and despotic origin of socialist neo-feudalism. On this occasion, N. Kradin in his "Political Anthropology" asks a rhetorical question about "why did Soviet Marxist science categorically ignore the role of power in the structure of Eastern societies and so stubbornly tried to reduce the discussion about the essence of the Asian mode of production to the study of property?» And he notes that "apparently, the answer here is simple. Both the founders of the Marxist doctrine and their later interpreters, as well as ordinary representatives of the party nomenklatura intuitively realized the similarity of the economic basis of Eastern despotism and the coming communism.

Neither under the Asiatic mode of production nor under communism is there private property. But in both cases there are rulers and those who are ruled. In the East, performing socially significant functions, the rulers gradually turned into exploiters. Where is the guarantee that the same thing will not happen under communism? It is no coincidence that K. Marx himself avoided discussing this issue with M. Bakunin. He refused, in fact, to argue with G.V. Plekhanov and V.I. Lenin at the IV Congress of the RSDLP (1906). During the years of Stalin's rule, the issue was generally removed from the agenda, the discussion was stopped, and those who disagree were shot or sent to camps for long periods. And later, Soviet censors vigilantly ensured that seditious allusions did not fall on the pages of books and scientific journals.

The author, however, does not bring his thought to its logical conclusion in several aspects. Despite the outward similarity of the xenocratic nature of the communist state, there are, nevertheless, some differences between it (or rather, socialist neo-feudalism) and eastern despotism.

We are talking, first of all, about the exopolitarism of socialist neo-feudalism itself for the conquest of the capital centers and the territorial periphery of the Russian Empire. Exopolitarianism was achieved through the unification of marginalized representatives of ethnic minorities, the use

of hired private armies and ideologically biased criminal groups, which, after the 1917 coup, were turned into a criminal servitariat.

The party nomenklatura, which actually represented new thieves in law and criminal servitariat (private armies, which later became "genid" structures for the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB, and later the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB), from among ethnic minorities, had competitors represented by representatives of the old nobility and officers, called Zhigans. Positioning themselves as an aristocracy of organized crime and introducing military discipline into organized gangs of thieves, robbers and robbers, the Zhigans opposed themselves to the Urkagans as the ohlos of the underworld.

As one of the researchers of the criminal subculture, Yu. Alexandrov, notes, "in the 1920s and 1930s, the first major conflict took place in the established criminal community. A part of the underworld refused to obey the Zhigans and supported the new emerging leaders – a lesson. The Urks were less "politicized" than the Zhigans, and were of the opinion that the criminal community should not deal with "social" issues, but should focus solely on the "professionalism" of criminals.

The constant conflict between Urks and Zhigans created a need to change and improve the "code" of the underworld. Gradually, based on even pre-revolutionary criminal customs and traditions, a single "law" was adopted to regulate the behavior of the highest representatives of the criminal environment. According to this law, the most authoritative criminals, who were respected by "ordinary" members of the criminal community, began to be called thieves in law" [1, p. 27].

Judging by the attempts of Zhigans to ideocratize the criminal environment and their noble-aristocratic origin, their organized criminal activity was part of the feudal-monarchist revenge in an attempt to destroy the Bolshevik kleptocracy by using criminal terror, which acted as an actual disguise for politically directed subversive (sabotage-terrorist) work.

The strategic goal of this activity was the restoration of the pre-revolutionary feudal-monarchist way of life, which the top of the Bolsheviks and the servitariat in the face of the Chechen could not help but guess. However, it was possible to predict the outcome of this struggle by drawing parallels between the "zhiganat" of the ideological part of the Bolsheviks from among the Leninist guards (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek) and the "urkanat" represented by Stalin and the little-known "outstanding mediocrities" who turned out to be in their subcultural features closer to the world of ordinary thieves, robbers and robbers than to the ideocratic-savvy part of the Bolsheviks.

The division between charismatic Zhigans and apparatchik urks, who became the mainstay of the regime not only in the ITU, but also in all macrostructures, up to the Comintern, is explained not so much by the political as by the cultural characteristics of the ethnic minorities represented in the first and second cohorts. If among the charismatic part of

the Zhigan Bolshevik aristocracy, first of all, subgroups of the marginalized ethno-minoritarian intelligentsia were represented, then among the lesson-apparatchiks there were the criminal majority of ethnic minorities, whose representatives performed "menial work" in the party (most often they had a criminal biography).

Typical conductors of the will of the criminal majority can be considered, for example, Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, representing the Caucasian ethnic groups, Latsis, Dzerzhinsky and Menzhinsky and Balitsky, representing the Polish ethnic groups. After the Stalinist coup and the subsequent "purges" of the party, the struggle against the supporters of the expelled and destroyed "Zhigans" took place under the arrangement of two ideological lines, the implementation of which in practice represents the ethnoshizoidism described above.

On the one hand, the Stalinist urks-apparatchiks fought against the remnants of the Bolshevik meritocracy, by unleashing terror, inducing part of it to ethnic and social mimicry and subsequent de-ethnization. On the other hand, pursuing a virtually anti-elitist personnel policy, among ordinary Soviet citizens (whom the language does not dare to call "citizens"), the fight against domestic manifestations of interethnic (interethnic) hatred became radicalized. Thus, the Stalinist party nomenklatura and its heirs, including the Brezhnev neo-Stalinists and their descendants in the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Ukraine, appropriated a kind of monopoly on anti-Semitism, while at the same time subjecting ordinary subjects to criminal prosecution for anti-Semitic statements.

Therefore, the communists, as representatives of the lower classes of the social and ethnic minorities of the Russian Empire, prompting some of the communists and non-communists to first mimic other ethnic groups, and then completely de-ethnize, made nationalists of all ethnic groups their worst enemies, trying to neutralize the latter by creating sham nationalist movements. However, the nationalists also did not remain in debt, enrolling self-de-ethnized half-breeds who merged with other ethnic minorities into a commune into a "racially inferior subgroup" as their "ideological enemies".

The result of the de-elitization of the ethnic periphery and the formation of neo-imperial potestarism was a new system of social stratification with nobility – the party nomenclature. It is worth paying attention to the fact that the term "nomenklatura" itself is applicable in the context of this study not only to describe the communist party nomenclature, but also to describe the cluster of ruling ethnic minorities represented by families-criminal-oligarchic clans and their criminal servitariat. We are talking about horizontally integrated groups that form mafia-oligarchic corporations and are represented by lists of individuals relying directly on the criminal servitariat ("private armies") as a key tool for dominating the population. In general, the very origin of the term originates from Latin and the legal lexicon of the Roman slave society.

The term "Nomenclator" denoted a specially trained slave who, during secular receptions and feasts on slave estates, stood at the entrance and voiced the names of incoming guests. M. Djilas, M. Voslensky and other researchers of the communist party nomenclature point to nominal, personal relations in the political class of the USSR and other feudal-socialist communities, where socialist feudalism was introduced as a result of the seizure of power.

This indication clearly indicates the non-institutional nature of the nomenklatura as an organized group that is "exopolitical" (a term used by N.I. Kradin) in relation to the society of its residence. That is, the nomenclature as a group enters this society as an occupier and interventionist, being an emissary of external centers of power. Nevertheless, the concealment of such an emissary becomes possible and necessary in order to provide this group with appropriate legitimacy, in particular, legal legitimacy.

Here, however, a significant problem arises. Legitimacy implies social consensus and discussion (social dialogue) as a way to come to such a consensus. But no organized criminal community is capable of either discussion or seeking consensus. Simply because the method of coming to power described above excludes both the first and the second. This makes the legal legitimacy of the nomenklatura's dominance as a criminal exopolitan community perpetually questionable.

Therefore, in the interests of self-preservation, it has to resort to various forms of terror, ranging from the usual use of the army and special punitive structures, and ending with the penitentiary and psychiatric isolation of opponents. At the final stage of their dominance in the USSR, the nomenklatura and the oligarchy, as its direct successor, reveals their criminal nature through the use of individual terror (political assassinations disguised as criminal offenses) in relation to representatives of the intelligentsia, individual media agents who are trying to carry out deep "archaeological excavations" of criminal and potestary mode.

Such individual terror of the praetorian guards and oprichnins is either disguised as "accidents", or "premature death as a result of poisoning" (in Ukraine, the most "fashionable" are political assassinations disguised as road accidents or domestic crime, in the Russian Federation – ordinary murders or poisonings of oppositionists, carried out by the power-protecting oprichnina of the FSB, in Belarus – secret political assassinations with the use of special forces).

The exopolitical features of the nomenklatura and oligarchic domination are also found in the use of criminal communities to suppress mass protests (which became famous thanks to the Party of Regions of V. Titushko and "titushki" with various "military sports communities in Ukraine"). In Belarus, as the experience of the 2020 elections already shows, the neo-Stalinist regime of Lukashenka uses in fact the same methods of brutal beatings of protesters with the participation of both uniformed riot police and unmarked police officers.

What unites all potestary regimes is their exopolitarity with respect to the population, which implies exactly the same form of power transit under open or latent external influence. It is not surprising that the Russian opposition is influenced by both foreign agents present in the Russian Federation and shadow actors of influence from the United States, while Belarus is influenced by the corresponding destabilization groups from Poland, the Czech Republic and Lithuania.

One of the researchers of the oligarchy, A. Oslund [6], considers the possibility of obtaining rent as one of the prerequisites for the emergence of the oligarchy. At the same time, the author states the differences in obtaining the rent itself in the conditions of the USA, Russia and Ukraine. The point is that "the important reasons for the enrichment of the robber barons in the United States were the free distribution of state assets, primarily land for the construction of railways, and cheap loans, while Russia and Ukraine were characterized by the sale of old assets through direct privatization or in the secondary market at low prices" (my italics – Yu.R.).

The maxim in italics, in its more detailed analysis, suggests a number of important differences in obtaining resource rent in the conditions of a feudal socialist society in Ukraine (as a despotoid society) from a capitalist society with a market economy.

First, it is a difference regarding the social capital and administrative resource necessary for access to cheap assets and secondary markets. Both the first and the second, being a derivative of client-patronage networks within ethnic minorities as the ruling classes of a feudal socialist society, presuppose a significant reduction in the cost of assets, even if they are obsolete.

From the point of view of the motivation of the oligarchs, this means a hidden depreciation of the resources they receive, which means that they are not motivated in their progressive modernization and prefer the rent-parasitic scenario for using the assets received to the scenario of productive market growth. It is the second scenario that stems from the primary accumulation of capital, when the rich become rich not abruptly and suddenly, but as a result of the slow maturation of financial and industrial oligarchic families. It is in such social and group environments that the Protestant morality of entrepreneurial frugality is formed, which, with its superficial assessment by players with a rent-feudal way of obtaining wealth, looks like litigation, hoarding and primitive greed.

It is clear that in the system of moral and ethical coordinates of the feudal oligarchy as a "leisure class", the meticulously petty attitude to money on the part of the industrial and financial oligarchy of bourgeois society is not just a contradiction between wastefulness and frugality.

Such thrift has socio-systemic consequences for the social structure of society, the morality of lower and middle social groups. Within the framework of such a morality, the lower and middle social strata of bourgeois society interpret forced enrichment as dubious and suspicious,

and subjects enriched in force regime are considered as unworthy of social trust. The negative reputation trail of the nouveau riche makes the latter objects of hidden moral stigmatization with further adverse consequences (close and captious scrutiny from the tax authorities, police and security services).

On the other hand, the very fact of "selling old assets through direct privatization" is generally (from the point of view of a market economy) a fiction. Because the laws of a market economy, in the presence of social capital and administrative resources, simply stop working. In this case, the sale itself turns into the usual transfer of assets from the hands of some "in-laws" to the hands of others, and the contractual framework for the sale and purchase acts as a distracting legal arrangement that masks patronage-client agreements.

The second point regarding resource rent in post-Soviet societies is, in contrast to the United States, in increasing its size due to the factually free (or symbolically paid) use of natural resources [2], which implies sustainable cultural and mental inflation among representatives of the oligarchy. Psychic inflation, combined with the feminine-centered mentality of the oligarchs, is one of the indicators of parasitic consumerism in culture, politics and business.

Presentation of the main material of the study. The first step in the study of despotism and dictatorship will be to build a chain of differential criteria for their analysis. From the point of view of the author of this study, these criteria are the cultural and socio-typological belonging of the first and second to different societies; prerequisites for social institutionalization and methods of coming to power; types of political leadership and the attitude of leaders of dictatorships/despotisms to corruption; features of the use of technologies of repression in relation to opposition groups.

Table 1

Differential Criteria for Despotisms and Dictatorships

Differential Criteria	*Despotism/Despotoidia*	*Dictatorships*
1	2	3
Cultural and socio-typologi- cal belonging to different societies	Belonging to pre-modern cultural systems and societies	Belonging to modern cultural systems and societies
Prerequisites for social institu- tionalization and methods of coming to power	Personalistic (extra-institu- tional, quasi-charismatic) orientation of power and its usurpation	Structural-institutional (with the peripherality of the charismatic component) orientation of power and its legitimate receipt

Table 1 (ending)

1	2	3
Power propaganda strategy	Utopian propaganda and transformational course of development. The propaganda leitmotif is "good (worthy) government – bad (unworthy) society and/or bad environ-ment". Negative narcissism of power in relation to society in the sector of symbolic capital. Monopolization of symbolic capital and its distribution based on the criteria of loyalty / devotion to power	Realist propaganda and a conservative course of devel-opment (Comte's principle of "progress as the development of order"). Propaganda leitmotif "power corresponding to society." Selective negative narcissism in relation to certain social groups and political parties. Assumption of a sphere of autonomous action in the distribution of symbolic capital
Types of political leadership and the attitude of leaders of dictatorships/ despotisms to corruption	Emotionally unstable (quasi-charismatic and personalistic) leadership with a tolerant attitude towards systemic corruption	Rational (in Weberian terminology – rational-legal) leadership with an intolerant attitude towards systemic corruption with selec-tive admission of corrupt practices
Features of the use of technolo-gies of repression in relation to opposition groups	Non-selective (generalized) repression on a group basis	Selective (cohort) repression on an individual basis
Features of the organization of the daily life of the population and the satisfac-tion of its basic needs	Purposeful torturality of everyday life. The construc-tion by the authorities of norms and living conditions that turn the satisfaction of basic needs into physical and mental torture and bullying in the long term. Purposeful negative narcissism of power in relation to society in the sectors of economic, political, symbolic bodily and mental capital and conditionally positive narcissism in the educational, cultural and social sectors.	Forced and situationally determined torturality of everyday life in certain historical periods. Deprivation, poverty, etc. social inconveniences as temporary conditions. Conditionally negative narcissism. power in relation to society in the sectors of economic, political, symbolic capital

Criterion 1. The first criterion involves distinguishing dictatorships and despotisms on the basis of their belonging to pre-modern/modern cultural and social systems. With internal and external diversity, all dictatorships are the product of culture and society of the modern type. The modernity of dictatorship embraces, in this context, cultural rationality, the legitimate institutionality derived from it, and its ordinariness as a political regime.

Cultural rationality assumes that dictatorships arise in response to the articulation of a rational social demand associated with a particular crisis situation. Such rationality is determined not so much by cultural consensus, the negotiation process, or the presence or absence of what is commonly called "civil society", but by the ability of elite groups to rationally (non-pompously, and therefore purposefully rational) articulate the essence of various general social problems.

In this aspect, one of the linguo-behavioral indicators of rationality in the articulation of society's problems by dictatorships is the "rhetoric of logos" in the very understanding of the system, logical coherence, and rationality of the verbal behavior of dictators. It is noteworthy that the propaganda of despotisms, as a rule, operates with the "rhetoric of pathos", which serves as a decorum for emotionally colored revolutionarism and populism.

That is why the images of despots (despotoids), in contrast to the images of dictators (dictatoids), are marked by features of emotionally pathetic false charisma, which expresses the culture of pre-modern (archaic) societies. The more archaic the culture and social system, the more pathetic the rhetoric and propaganda of power becomes, the more emotional and vague the contours of social problems and images of enemies become, the more spontaneous "creativity" of the masses the regime allows.

The vague pathos of rhetoric, its sensuality in the conditions of despotism corresponds to construction and architectural monumentalism and gigantomania. Enormous both in terms of physical size and funding volumes, administrative buildings, cultural facilities, bridges, defensive structures have a truly micronizing effect on the perceivers: an individual feels like a grain of sand in the huge overwhelming power of the structure.

Logically correlated with the emotionality of culture is the aggressiveness of society, the dominance of social groups in it with a deficit of cultural, social and economic capital, cultural, social and economic poor and beggars. The reliance of despotisms and despotoidies as premodern political regimes on ochlocracy and kakisocracy in the social and stratification aspect suggests the presence in the social character of the corresponding population groups of affective dispositions of negative narcissism: envy, humiliation, infringement / low value, anger, capriciousness / volatility. Malignant narcissism of the social rank and file correspond to behavioral strategies focused on spontaneous, uncriteria, senseless violence.

Note that here we are talking not so much about the external side of violence, but about the criterion / non-criteria of its motivation. Emotionally determined violence in the conditions of despotisms or despotoid regimes

presupposes and allows extra-procedural (extraordinary) use of it, bypassing institutions, procedures and social order.

Both in everyday life and in big politics, despotism in the behavior of individuals or groups is focused on "high-speed technologies" for making political and administrative decisions, legal proceedings, economic enrichment and the appropriation of cultural values, since the value for both the despot and his followers / guides in these actions have not so much their rational-criteria orientation, but the immediacy and urgency of repression, the insatiable "urgency" of enrichment, the accelerated internalization of cultural capital, in particular, the receipt of a "quick" education, "rapid" economic growth, etc.

Criterion 2. The prerequisites for social institutionalization and the ways of coming to power for despotisms and dictatorships suggest non-institutional and illegitimate ways of coming to power of despotisms (quasi-despotism) and, as a rule, institutional and legitimate ways of coming to power by dictatorships and dictatorships.

Despotisms and despotoidias are predominantly exopolitan. Dictatorships are endopolitan. Thus, the party nomenklatura in the USSR, its branch in the Ukrainian SSR, which subsequently simulatively self-prohibited itself in the interests of self-preservation and converted administrative resources into the appropriation (privatization) of state assets, retains its exopolitanism, which corresponds to the exoculturalism of yesterday's conquerors.

The exopolitarity of despotisms and despotoids is expressed in the replacement of social institutions by shadow groups of influence that privatize and corrupt institutions, essentially turning them into simulacra. All that remains of the institution is its formal organizational shell, which covers the pervasive corrupt practices of influence groups. In this aspect, the structuring of power becomes little different from the structuring of organized criminal groups, the recursion of which is corporatism and banditry in all spheres of social life (political banditry in politics, economic banditry in the economy, scientific (academic) banditry in science, etc.).

Dictatorship, with different degrees of its odiousness, retains continuity with the social order of the past with its inherent traditionalism, institutionalism and structural continuity/endopolitarity. The vast amounts of power of dictators, however, presuppose that they retain their instrumental status in relation to society. For despotisms, unlike dictatorships, societies become spaces of continuous interventions and unlimited repressions of the power machine.

The illegitimate appropriation of the owners' assets and their transformation into holders and operational managers, characteristic of despotisms, completes their economic "portrait". Rational-legal taxation of dictatorships in the conditions of despotism turns into "feeding" – an archaic way of extracting rent, bypassing rational-legal (as a rule – financial-budgetary and transparent, centralized) mechanisms for extracting and redistributing part of the income.

Regarding feeding (fodder), Sverdlov notes that in the process of its origin in a tribal society, a dual nature was laid in the "fodder": a direct connection with taxes, originally voluntary, in the form of natural offerings – "gift", and their transformation into a form of provision in peacetime of the prince, noble people and their combatants.

In the process of formation and development of statehood in Rus' in the 9th-13th centuries. "fodder" as a state taxable institution developed according to its external form, natural, monetary or cash-in-kind. In the socio-political content, "fodder" continued (and continues – Yu.R.) the function of material support for service genetically embedded in it: in the 9th-10th centuries. provision in kind during polyudya – feeding, distribution of money to combatants, in-kind or monetary provision of members of the state apparatus directly or after redistribution in the treasury" [6].

In Ukraine, the relationship of feeding remains, but not with the fief (feud), as the author notes, but with the receipt of feudal corruption rent from beneficiaries/asset flows as the main source of income for the servitariat-militariat (private armies of the oligarchy and subordinate power-protective structures) and part of the employees (discipline), the subjects of which occupy criminal-familiar beneficiaries (farming positions that allow receiving feudal corruption rent at the expense of natural or state monopolies, as well as management and infrastructure sectors that control certain financial flows or resources, including oil and gas trade , electricity, drugs, weapons, shadow prostitution). At the same time, preference in the oligarchic stratum is given to forced methods of enrichment.

Conclusions. In general, it is fundamentally important in this context to build differences between the peculiarities of the organization of power institutions in Eastern and Western cultural and social systems. It is about the differences between dictatorship and despotism-tyranny.

In the discourse of ordinary and journalistic consciousness, the confusion of the content of these concepts is quite frequent without ascertaining the socio-cultural "binding" of dictatorship to the Western model of power organization, and despotism/tyranny to the Eastern one. At the same time, the absence of this link deprives the very opposition of the West and the East within the cultural dichotomy itself.

The semantic differences relate to the connection between dictatorship and normative incorporations (of religious, ideological, legal origin) and despotism/tyranny and personality-colored complexes, so that any tyrannical and despotic model violates the institutional logic of society. On the other hand, no institutionality and institutional logic is compatible with tyranny and despotism, but only with dictatorship, which in its implementation presupposes the dictator's bondage to an articulated will.

Despotism and tyranny initially imply the depreciation of any public rhetoric of power, which always runs counter to its practices. Despotism and tyranny suggest a rhetorical decorum of legitimacy for actual lawlessness, expressed in personalized ideological, political, legal and other decisions of the despot/tyrant. Nepotism, favoritism and kronism therefore in most cases

accompany despotism and tyranny, but, on the other hand, dictatorship presupposes, along with the extra-ordinary charismatic personality of the dictator, a trail of mediocrities trailing behind him, performing the routine work of institutional building without claiming privileges and "bonuses". ' from power.

Thus, Stalinism, the Chilean and Paraguayan regimes of Pinochet and Stroessner, Chinese communism ("pragmatic socialism") of Deng Xiaoping, the Khmer Rouge-Pol Pot regime unite tyrannical and despotic/despotoid components that distinguish them from dictatorships, namely: the formation of authorities on the basis of interkinship (friendly) alliances (nepotism and kronism), favoritism, ignoring the social and professional suitability and compliance of individuals with the status-role niches occupied in the state apparatus, the adoption of personalized legal acts for the distribution of official beneficiaries (the famous change in the law on the prosecutor's office in favor of appointing a person from a close circle as the prosecutor general contact circle, distribution of posts to friends who are far from political and administrative activities); selective law enforcement based on emotionally colored reactions to criticism by the environment of the personality of a despot/tyrant; the use of military-criminal social groups and technologies for the implementation of personal persecution of critics of the regime, etc.

For comparison: the national socialism of Hitler, the Iberian national-clerical regimes of Salazar and Franco characterize the dictatorship as an ideocratic type of exercise of power.

Western modern style, based on ideocracy, while all despotisms are in the indicated aspect unprincipled and ideological, although they are trying to create an image of ideology and "value". Such an image usually turns out to be a fake in the performance of despotism, and behind the constant hackneyed talk about "values" lies an ordinary crime that begins to crawl out of all the cracks when the legitimate powers of the next "guarantor" end.

The above gives reason to consider despotism as a non-institutional and non-ideological form of power, depending on the mental characteristics of the head of state (to be even more precise, pathopsychic features). It is the latter that are put at the forefront in the conditions of any despotic regime. A dictator always has to remember about institutions, since the authorization of his will is based on previous establishments, a system of institutions, and, in a certain sense of the word, forget about himself as a person, forget about his own, all too human, in exercising power.

A despot or tyrant is not bound by any institutions, which, under the conditions of their rule, depend on the moods, whims, whims of themselves and their short-sighted, degenerate, infantile environment. The whims of despots and tyrants are usually not dictated by any power-state necessity, but solely by the need to pose on the "podium" of their own complexes. That is why the proximity of despotisms and tyrannies to African (since Africa, from a socio-historical point of view, is the "childhood" of mankind), but not to Asian, and, moreover, not to European and American cultural systems, can be considered quite reasonable.

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Святненко І. А., Романенко Ю. В. Деспотії та диктатури в потестарних та тоталітарних суспільствах: проблеми диференційного аналізу в елітології та соціології політики (частина 1)

У статті побудовано описово-аналітичну диференційну характеристику деспотій і диктатур, потестарних і тоталітарних суспільств.

Наголошується на тому, що в оперуванні поняттями диктатури та деспотизму часто допускається величезна семантична плутанина. Пояснюється це, зокрема, морально-ідеологічною упередженістю дослідників, у яких домінує бажання не стільки аналітично відобразити це явище, скільки сформувати стереотипи упередженого ставлення як до перших, так і до других, з їхньою полярною протилежністю. конструктивно-функціональні особливості. Помічено, що водночас зазначену упередженість може посилювати робота ЗМІ, які вдаються до використання емоційно забарвленої лексики, намагаючись або демонізувати деспотів і диктаторів, об'єднавши їх в одну групу, або навпаки, харизматизувати своє панування, коли за ним ховається відповідний суспільний лад.

Відзначено, що нас навряд чи цікавлять мотиви та наміри, які спонукають різних акторів у їхньому бажанні вкрай очорнити або оббілити диктаторів і деспотів. Наголошується на тому, що автор цього дослідження не поділяє оціночний підхід у трактуванні диктатури та деспотизму, оскільки вважає його таким, що відводить від предмета дослідження. Пояснюється, що за «феноменологією» кровопролиття та жертвоприношень стоїть інша структурна та функціональна «онтологія» суспільств, їх централізованих держав і політичних режимів. Над цією «онтологією» височить ієрархія культурних і соціальних ідентичностей, які зображують диктатуру і деспотизм як специфічну культурну і соціальну систему. Водночас культурна та соціальна система повторюється у візуальних рисах тіла/обличчя, спостережуваній поведінці, невербальній комунікації, супровідному символічному середовищі та візуальних рисах щоденних практик деспотів і диктаторів.

Ключові слова: *деспотія, деспотизм, диктатура, потестарні суспільства, тоталітарні суспільства, домодерні культурні та соціальні системи, модерні культурні та соціальні системи.*